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Abstract: This article presents a synopsis of the contextual conditions, factors and challenges under
which the recent evolution of tax systems has taken place, as an introduction to this United Nations
University-World Institute for Development Economics Research Special Issue. The article, as the
studies in this collection, gives especial emphasis to the role natural endowments, political economy,
social structure and history, and the interplay between politics and tax revenues. These are relevant issues,
considering that the Millennium Development Goals and now the Sustainable Development Goals have
placed ﬁscal policy, and tax policy and revenue mobilisation in particular, at the centre of national and
international development efforts. Delivering on the Sustainable Development Goals will require a level
of state revenue mobilisation capacity inmanyways unprecedented in the history of development policy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The last two decades or so have seen a renewed interest in the role of ﬁscal policy in
stimulating economic growth, diversifying economies and reducing poverty. For some
countries, reducing high levels of social inequality is also on the agenda, especially when
the pattern of growth is quite narrow in its direct beneﬁts via employment and livelihoods,
which is largely the case in economies with substantial extractives sectors. This
necessitates more reliance on the ﬁscal system as a means towards achieving ‘inclusive
growth’, whereby effective institutions for revenue policy and collection as well as for
public expenditure management are vital to redistributing resource rents (Daniel, Keen,
Świstak, & Thuronyi, 2017; Mosley, 2017). This broader range of goals for ﬁscal policy
marks a shift from its narrow focus on macro-economic stabilisation in the 1980s and early
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1990s, when a combination of terms of trade shocks and institutional weaknesses in public
expenditure management and revenue mobilisation led to often desperate ﬁscal crises and
painful ‘structural adjustment’ (Addison, 2015; Stewart, 1996).
More ‘ﬁscal space’ started to become available from the 1990s onwards as debt relief
accelerated, especially through the successive Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
initiatives (Addison, Hansen, & Tarp, 2004). Additionally, a renewal of economic growth
started to generate more tax revenue, which was ampliﬁed as tax reform, including a major
reconstruction of tax-collection systems, began to raise revenue to gross domestic product
(GDP) ratios in many, but not all, countries (see Figures 1 and 2). This, together with the
hard grind of public expenditure reform—still, however, ongoing—created more ﬁscal
space to start addressing a broader range of policy goals in addition to just that of
macro-economic stability.
The Millennium Development Goals and now the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) have placed ﬁscal policy, including domestic resource mobilisation, at the
centre of national and international development efforts (United Nations, 2015). The
SDGs imply large and sustained public expenditures to continue the success of
the Millennium Development Goals in improving human development indicators,
especially in the areas of access to basic health care and primary education, with
a particular emphasis on ending gender discrimination (Addison, Niño-Zarazúa, &
Tarp, 2015; Grown, Addison, & Tarp, 2016).
Moreover, the SDGs also imply large-scale public expenditures to support improved
livelihoods for poor people—via better infrastructure access, more research into
smallholder crops, etc.—not only to end poverty but also to help close gaps in the
distribution of wealth and income by gender, region, and income-category. Finally, climate
change will impose large ﬁscal burdens as the frequency and intensity of extreme weather
events increase, requiring more public expenditure on disaster relief and, in some cases,
reducing the tax base through economic damage consequent on increased drought and
ﬂooding. Climate adaption and mitigation, as well as the achievement of other
environmental goals such as improved urban air quality and reduced water pollution, are
additional substantial demands on the public purse.
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Figure 1. Total tax revenue including social security contributions by income groups
Source: Authors’ own calculations, based on GRD data.
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Domestic resource mobilisation has also been encouraged by aid donor countries, as the
growth in ofﬁcial development assistance has been less than expected (‘aid fatigue’).
OECD-DAC donors came under pressure with the ﬁnancial crisis of 2009–2010, and
the resulting recession, leading to a slowdown in the growth of real aid volumes, with large
cuts to bilateral aid budgets in some cases. Donors have placed greater emphasis on
the ‘social contract’ between states and citizens (Mosley, 2014). This has strong ﬁscal
dimensions, as the willingness of citizens to pay or evade taxes is motivated in part by whether
they perceive the burden of taxation to be fair as well as the distribution of the spending it
ﬁnances, including the spatial pattern of public spending within countries which is often
correlated with, and a determinant of, local poverty and human development outcomes.
Delivering on the SDGs requires a level of state capacity that is in many ways
unprecedented in the history of development policy. Local and central government, and
their supporting administrations, must prioritize spending in the context of many
competing demands and trade-offs, and build effective mechanisms to manage and spend
public money. Some of the increased revenues generated by better tax systems must be
spent on the state itself. This is especially so in the group of fragile states, including
those where rebuilding and reforming the ﬁscal system is vital to achieving peace and
stability―as well as achieving recoveries that are inclusive in their beneﬁts (Addison,
Chowdhury, & Murshed, 2004; Gupta et al., 2009).
In sum, the role of ﬁscal policy in development has broadened over time, and tax policy
and revenue mobilisation have moved up the policy agenda. Accordingly, there is now
a renewed interest in the economics literature over ﬁscal policy in relation to
economic growth, poverty reduction, and income inequality (Alesina & Ardagna, 2010;
Muinelo-Gallo & Roca-Sagalés, 2013; 2014; Woo, 2011). Notably, the economics
literature on tax policy in low-income countries (LICs) and middle-income countries
(MICs) is now closer to the literature on tax policy in advanced economies. This includes
a greater emphasis on the quality of tax institutions, including benchmarking progress in
tax administrations and issues around compliance and how this can be best improved
without damaging real economic activity (Keen & Slemrod, 2017).
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Figure 2. Total tax revenue including social security contributions by regions
Source: Authors’ own calculations, based on GRD data.
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Despite the relatively extensive literature that explores the relationship between tax
policy and developmental concerns in the domains of inter alia governance (Alesina,
Campante, & Tabellini, 2008; Baldacci, Hillman, & Kojo, 2004; Marjit, Mukherjee, &
Kolmar, 2006; Moore, 2007), democracy (Ganghof & Genschel, 2008; Herb, 2005;
Mutascu, 2011; Persson & Tabellini, 1994), growth (Bleaney, Gemmell, & Kneller,
2001; Devereux & Wen, 1998; Jaimovich & Rebelo, 2017; Scully, 2003; Yakita, 2003)
and how the tax structure of nations impact efﬁciency and equity considerations
(Atkinson & Stiglitz, 1972, 1976; Deaton, 1977; Feldstein, 1972; Gordon, 1983; Shavell,
1981), and generate incentives for tax evasion and avoidance (Emmens & Kephart, 2005;
Sandmo, 2005; Slemrod, 2007; Slemrod & Yitzhaki, 2002), there is also a general
recognition that signiﬁcant knowledge gaps still exist in better understanding the
underlying structural, institutional and normative factors that have permitted (or limited)
the building of effective states as conditio sine qua non for economic and social progress
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Besley & Persson, 2011).
2 DATA
To a very large extent, data limitations have hampered prospects for expanding and
deepening the research base on these vital policy questions. The most widely used
cross-country database on government revenues has been the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) Government Finance Statistics (GFS).1 However, the IMF GFS has so far offered a
limited and truncated sample of developing countries, often with inconsistencies across
time and space (Prichard, 2016).
In recent years, a few datasets have been constructed to improve the limited samples in
the IMF GFS data (Baskaran & Bigsten, 2013; Benedek, Crivelli, Gupta, & Muthoora,
2014; Haber & Menaldo, 2011); however, the proliferation of multiple datasets that rely
on dissimilar methodologies, and which often poorly document adjustments to data, has
made international comparisons very difﬁcult.
More recently, the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD) and the
United Nations University-World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-
WIDER) initiated a collaboration on taxation, revenue mobilisation and development with
the objective of encouraging the creation and distribution of more accurate data on
government revenues as well as its analysis for policy. This initiative builds upon
the previous work initiated by ICTD in developing the Government Revenue Database
(GRD), which harmonizes data from several major international databases including (i)
the IMF GFS; (ii) the OECD Tax Statistics dataset2; (iii) the Revenue Statistics in Latin
America and the Caribbean dataset,3 which is constructed by the OECD, the United
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the Inter-American
Centre of Tax Administrators and the Inter-American Development Bank; (iv) the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators; and (v) the African Economic Outlook and data
compiled from all available IMF Article IV reports.
The work on the GRD dataset has resulted in a more complete and accurate international
GRD, and one that will be regularly updated by UNU-WIDER, and made openly and
1For further details, see: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfs/manual/gfs.htm
2For further details, see https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=REV
3For further detuiahttp://www.oecd.org/ctp/revenue-statistics-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-24104736.htm
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widely available through the UNU-WIDER website: https://www.wider.unu.edu/project/
government-revenue-database. An important aim of this collaboration is to encourage
the use of the GRD in research on the role of taxation and revenue mobilisation in
achieving inclusive and sustainable economic and social development. This Special Issue
of The Journal of International Development aims to contribute to this goal.
Revenue mobilisation and tax policy constitute a critical set of development issues, as
discussed earlier in this introduction to the Special Issue. Over the past four decades, the
evolution of tax systems, their composition and contribution to government revenues has
been marked by a distinct variation across world regions and country income groups.
Broadly, LICs and MICs in the sub-Saharan African, Latin American and especially Asian
regions have exhibited a limited revenue capacity—measured by total tax revenue as a
percentage of GDP—relative to high income countries in North America and Europe,
although the capacity of the former groups of countries has gradually started to rise over
the past decade (see Figures 1 and 2). This clearly is positive news, although the level of
tax revenues in the poorest countries remains insufﬁcient to fully ﬁnance developmental
spending, leaving aid with an important and continuing role.
An important aspect of these recent trends is the composition of tax revenues. As shown
in Figure 3, the share of direct taxes—that is, income taxes on individuals and corporations
—has been somewhat stable among LICs and MICs, although the contribution of direct
taxes to total tax receipts has slightly increased since the ﬁrst decade of the 2000s. This
suggests that there is, in principle, considerable scope for a broader personal income tax
base across the developing world, which in turn makes it possible to introduce more
progressivity into the income tax system. This task is, however, contingent upon a myriad
of political economy factors, including incumbents’ incentives and preferences for
redistribution, in what are increasingly competitive political systems (Alesina & Giuliano,
2011; Caselli & Cunningham, 2009; Dhami, 2003).
The main trend in the tax composition has been the increase in the share of tax revenue
that is raised by consumption taxes (Figure 4). The main driver here has been a widespread
Figure 3. The tax mix (shares of direct vs indirect taxes out of total revenue) by income groups
Source: Authors’ own calculations, based on GRD data.
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adoption of the value-added tax (VAT), which has gradually replaced trade tax revenue as
countries began to liberalize their trade from the 1980s onwards.4
3 THIS COLLECTION
The economic literature on tax and revenue mobilisation in developing countries has
predominantly focused on identifying common problems to tax collection, studying the
impacts of a given tax policy, and studying the trade-offs between efﬁciency and equity
in a general equilibrium framework.
Questions regarding the link between the tax structure and economic growth and
economic performance, especially in the context of developing countries, have not yet
been sufﬁciently addressed. Indeed, important questions in the domains of economic
performance, political economy and political dynamics remain open: (i) Why nations, even
at similar levels of economic converge exhibit huge variation in their ﬁscal capacity? (ii)
What policy strategies (and conditions) have recently facilitated the revenue capacity
and redistribution efforts of developing regions? (iii) What structural and political
economy factors have shaped the capacity of states to mobilize tax revenues that ultimately
help build welfare institutions? These are major questions. Fiscal capacity is an essential
ingredient for economic growth, redistribution and the provision of public goods.
On 14–15 March 2016, UNU-WIDER together with ICTD organized a ‘Symposium on
Taxation and Revenue Mobilization in Developing Countries’ with the aim of addressing
these key questions. The papers that constitute this Special Issue are the result of this joint
effort and contribute to the literature of tax policy, its macroeconomic aspects and its
political economy dimensions.
The studies by Kyle McNabb, Alex Cobham and Petr Janský, and Martin Hearson focus
on a ﬁrst set of questions, linking taxation and the tax structure of countries with growth
4For a recent analysis on the impacts of the adoption of the VAT on tax revenues and inequality see Alavuotunki
et al. (2017).
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Figure 4. Share of domestic consumption taxes (the VAT and excises) by regions
Source: Authors’ own calculations, based on GRD data.
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and economic performance, tax evasion and avoidance and tax treaties, respectively,
whereas the study by Bruno Martorano addresses the second set of questions that are
related to issues of taxation and redistribution by focusing on Latin America, a region that
has experienced reductions in income inequality over the past 15 years.
More speciﬁcally, the paper by McNabb (2018) considers the effects of revenue neutral
changes in tax structures on economic growth, using a panel of approximately one hundred
developing and developed countries. According to his results, one of the most drastic
changes in the tax structure—the move from trade to domestic consumption taxes—has
had a positive impact on growth only in lower-middle income countries. He also ﬁnds that
revenue neutral increases in personal income taxes or social contributions are found to be
harmful for long-run per capita GDP growth rates. The study highlights the importance of
heterogeneity in the relationship between tax structures and growth, which also means that
policy statements about growth-conducive tax reforms must take country circumstances
into account.
The study by Cobham and Janský (2018) examines the impacts of tax competition on
the corporate income tax base. They revisit the inﬂuential study by Crivelli, de Mooij,
and Keen (2016) using the GRD data and conﬁrm that the results of the earlier study
remain valid with the new data. On average, countries seem to lose less as a result of
international spillovers in corporate taxation, but the difference in the extent of the loss
between country groups is greater when compared with the original study: relative to their
GDP, developing countries are more vulnerable to international tax competition than
developed countries are.
The study by Hearson (2018) examines the determinants of having a tax treaty. In
principle, tax treaties are meant to make sure foreign ﬁrms are not double taxed on the
proﬁts they earn abroad, thus making countries with treaties more attractive as investment
destinations. However, a general concern is that the terms of the treaties are often not
favourable at all to developing countries, with the implication that the base upon which they
could potentially be taxed is made too narrow. Using data from the GRD together with
information on the quantity and quality of tax treaties, Hearson ﬁnds that countries that
are relatively more dependent on corporate income tax revenue negotiate treaties
with higher withholding rates, but these treaties are no better in terms of other quality
characteristics. Countries that have in general a greater tax capacity—measured by the
tax to GDP ratio—are more likely to negotiate better clauses in areas that are less well-
understood by non-specialists, including minimum levels of activity before foreign
companies are liable for taxation—often referred to as permanent establishment—and
provisions on particular types of income such as capital gains, pensions, and social security
contributions. The overall conclusion of the paper is that developing countries should strive
to renegotiate their tax treaties in order to broaden their tax bases.
The paper by Martorano (2018) analyses how the composition and type of taxes have
inﬂuenced income distribution in Latin America. He ﬁnds that the increasing contribution
of direct taxes since the early 2000s—relative to indirect taxes that were more dominant
during the 1990s—led to more progressive tax systems in the Latin American region,
which in turn contributed to a reduction in income inequality. However, given the high
initial levels of inequality, and the low average tax revenue and limited capacity to tax
top incomes, the redistributive effect of the tax system remains modest.
The third set of questions, on the relationship between democracy and tax revenue
mobilisation (and the effect of political party system institutionalisation and political
competition on the level of tax revenues), are examined in the studies by Armin von
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Schiller and Urbain Thierry Yogo and Martine Michele. The role of natural endowments
in developing countries’ revenue mobilisation efforts, the incentives that these resources
generate for institutional building and the legacy of conﬂict (and how it affects ﬁscal
capacity in fragile states in the context of Africa) are issues examined in the studies
by Christian von Haldenwang and Maksym Ivanyna, and Vanessa van den
Boogaard, et al., respectively.
More speciﬁcally, von Schiller (2018) examines the determinants of personal income
tax in developing countries contexts, where reliance on this type of taxes is weak and often
linked to limited bureaucratic capacity. Von Schiller ﬁnds evidence that stronger
(democratic) political party systems are positively associated with personal income tax
revenue, and this link is stronger in countries with weak bureaucratic capacity. There is
quite a large degree of heterogeneity in these relationships, although no speciﬁc
subsample is identiﬁed to clearly drive the results. The author concludes that for sustained
success in revenue generation, the state must be credibly committed as regards linking
taxes to the provision of public goods—an issue that we return to in the conclusion to
this article—and that political parties have an important role to play in fostering this
reciprocal relationship.
The study by Yogo and Ngo Njib (2018) empirically estimate the impact of political
competition on tax collection in developing countries. The theoretical predictions
regarding the inﬂuence of political competition on tax take are not clear cut. More political
competition could mean, for instance, that voters have more freedom to vote for greater
redistribution and because the median voter typically earns less than the mean income, this
would tend to lead to increased revenues. Obviously, political preferences can vary in free
democracies, and the overall impact is ambiguous. The overall results of the study are that,
on average, greater political competition is associated with higher tax revenues. However,
this relationship does not hold for countries that have adopted ﬁscal rules, whose direct
impact on revenues tends to be positive, thus perhaps reducing the need for political
processes to enforce tax collection.
Concerns about how terms-of-trade shocks affect government revenue capacity, and
how countries with a high dependence on natural resource revenues perform in such
contexts, are addressed in the paper by von Haldenwang and Ivanyna (2018). The authors
ﬁnd that revenue in resource-dependent countries is more vulnerable to external shocks,
especially among richer countries, than non-resource dependent countries. Somewhat
surprising is the ﬁnding that the difference between resource-rich and non-resource-rich
countries is less pronounced in the group of poorer countries. The authors also ﬁnd that
the volatility of ﬁscal revenues declined in the 2000s relative to earlier decades, while
political regime types do not seem to reduce the vulnerability of government revenues to
external shocks.
Finally, the study by van den Boogaard, Prichard, Benson, and Milicic (2018) analyses
the tax revenue mobilisation capacity of a number of conﬂict-affected nations since the
1980s. The authors ﬁrst review different theoretical predictions about the impact of conﬂict
on revenue collection. One hypothesis is that the government attempts to collect additional
revenues before conﬂict to ﬁnance its war efforts, while adverse economic consequences
can negatively inﬂuence available resources during conﬂicts. Based on a cross-country
analysis and more in-depth country analysis, the authors ﬁnd that overall, conﬂicts have
a negative impact of revenue mobilisation. So, in contrast to European nations (Tilly,
1975), mobilisation for war, and the type of conﬂicts that have affected developing
countries, do not appear to facilitate tax collection.
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4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
While progress in tax capacity in poor countries has been made, important challenges
remain. As the studies in this special issue highlight, these challenges are linked to
international aspects of taxation, countries’ dependence on natural endowments, social
structure and history, and the interplay between politics and revenues. Making further
progress in tax capacity will depend on multiple factors, but especially on the social
contract that states are able to build with tax payers, and where the willingness to pay taxes
is increased if there is a reciprocal link with better quality services being provided by the
state (Lenton, Masiye, & Mosley, 2017).
The studies in this special issue have used the GRD dataset as the primary data source
and consequently adopt cross-country analyses and economic and political economy
analytical frameworks. Concerns about the microeconomics of taxation, incumbent
behaviour and the politics of tax policy in speciﬁc country-level contexts, as well as other
areas identiﬁed by individual papers in this special issue, represent important areas for
future research.
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